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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The adoption, without amendment or dissent, of the proposed Code of 
Professional Responsibility (Code) by the American Bar Association (ABA) 
at its annual meeting in August 1969 may symbolize a high water mark in 
the profession’s sense of its social worth.1  A Special Committee on 
Evaluation of Professional Standards was created in mid-1964 by then-ABA 
President Lewis F. Powell, Jr.2  The Committee worked in secret for four 
 
* Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law. 
1. Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 378,  
389–92 (1969). 
2. Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 365,  
381–83 (1964).  
1
Ariens: Modern American Legal Profession, 1969–Present
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
672 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:671 
years, finally presenting a tentative draft to 550 lawyers in October 1968 and 
a proposed draft to 20,000 lawyers in January 1969.3  The responses to those 
drafts brought some relatively minor changes to the Code, changes 
sufficient to make it possible for the ABA House of Delegates to adopt it 
as presented.   
The Code was structured to reinforce the positive, social good private 
practice lawyers might, and did, accomplish in representing their clients.  
The private lawyer’s duty to represent clients diligently and zealously was at 
the forefront of the Code’s ideology, though that duty was couched in terms 
of its social utility.   
The Code was shaped as a tripartite structure: it consisted of nine broadly 
phrased Canons.  In each Canon, a series of statements called Ethical 
Considerations emphasized what a lawyer might consider (and choose to 
do) to serve both client and society.  These Considerations were 
“aspirational in character.”4  Only after stating those Ethical Considerations 
did the Code list a number of Disciplinary Rules—standards that all lawyers 
were required to meet or be subject to discipline.  The Disciplinary Rules 
were thus “mandatory in character.”5 
This era of contentment6 continued for a few years.  Most state supreme 
courts and state bar associations adopted the Code as law, usually with few 
substantive amendments.7  The era of discontent arrived during the lawyers’ 
scandal of Watergate8 in 1973 and 1974.  Lawyers were attacked from all 
corners for serving the interests of their clients to the exclusion of the 
public.  Lawyers offered both a mea culpa and a story that contradicted this 
narrative: lawyers were imperfect but did their best to improve society.  In 
particular, legal elites refuted the suggestion that lawyers acted simply as 
 
3. See Michael Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 433–43 
(2008) (discussing the history of the Code drafted by the Wright Committee and its adoption by states). 
4. Id. at 439. 
5. Id. 
6. See Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970–1985, 5 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. 
& ETHICS 135, 159–71 (2014) (presenting a study of those discontented at the time). 
7. By 1972, forty-three states, as well as the District of Columbia, adopted the Code as law.  
Another four state bar associations adopted the Code as applicable to members.  Earl F. Morris, Report 
of Special Committee to Secure Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP.740, 741 
(1972). 
8. See Richard B. Allen, Watergate—A Lawyers’ Scandal, 60 A.B.A. J. 1257, 1257 (1974) (decrying 
lawyer involvement in Watergate); James D. Fellers, President’s Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 529, 529 (1975) (noting 
“Watergate was characterized as a lawyer’s scandal”); see also Ariens, supra note 6, at 174–77 (discussing 
the impact of Watergate on the legal profession). 
2
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their clients’ hired guns.9  Insofar as lawyers acknowledged this widespread 
criticism, they often blamed an overcrowding of the profession, which made 
underemployed lawyers willing to engage in unethical behavior.10 
There was a small truth in the “overcrowding” thesis.  Lawyers had 
captured significant surplus value in the 1960s and early 1970s,11 and their 
incomes rose accordingly.12  The profession increased by over 50% during 
the 1970s,13 and the median real income (that is, adjusted for inflation) of 
lawyers dropped significantly.14  This decline in real income affected more 
than those attorneys in the bottom half.  A study of large law firm partners 
found a decline in real income from the mid-1970s through the mid-
1980s.15  Economic conditions continued to affect the income of lawyers 
as the recession of the early 1980s led to layoffs and diminished job 
prospects for lawyers.16  
When the economy turned positive after this recession, the profession as 
a whole enjoyed great economic success.  Legal services continued to take 
an increasing percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).17  However, 
 
9. See Michael Ariens, Sorting: Legal Specialization and the Privatization of the American Legal Profession, 
29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579, 591 (2016) (discussing legal elite response to Watergate). 
10. See Reece Smith, Jr., Report of the Task Force on Utilization, 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 818, 819 
(1972) (reporting ABA charge to task force was to alleviate lawyer worries about “the increase in the 
number of new entrants into the profession”); see also Special Report, The Job Gap for College Graduates in 
the ’70s, BUS. WK., Sept. 23, 1972, at 48, 51 (concluding the outlook for lawyers is grim). 
11. B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 51, 62–63 (1978). 
12. Id. at 67 (“The rise in new admissions since 1963 is a response to the rise of the legal earnings 
above long-run equilibrium earnings.”). 
13. See BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL 
PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S 4 (Am. Bar Found., 1985) 
(noting an increase from 355,242 in 1970 to 542,205 in 1980). 
14. See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?: Perspectives 
on a Turbulent Market, 14  L. & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 448 (1989) (showing the lawyer’s median income 
greatly dropped during the 1970s). 
15. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 52–53 (1991) 
(commenting on the shift within law firms as more profit-oriented though working more hours does 
not automatically result in an increased income). 
16. See Peter W. Bernstein, Profit Pressures on the Big Law Firms, FORBES, Apr. 19, 1982, at 86–87 
(commenting on the 1980s recession and its direct correlation to diminished job prospects); The Big-
Law Business, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 16, 1984, at 87 (discussing the changing climate of the 1980s for 
lawyers and big firms). 
17. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1369, 1378 (2006) (“[T]he legal services industry . . . grew from about four-tenths (0.4%) of one 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1978 to about one and eight-tenths percent (1.8%) 
in 2003.”). 
3
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the distribution of this added income was uneven at best and distorted at 
worst.  From the 1970s on, private practice lawyers were increasingly sorted 
into starkly different income categories, often based on the clients they 
served.18  Those lawyers serving corporate clients drew an ever-increasing 
share of all legal services.  When adjusted for inflation to the value of a dollar 
in 2000, the amount lawyers received from business entities increased from 
$8.64 billion in 1967 to $79.61 billion in 2002.19  That overall prosperity 
continued until the economic devastation of the Great Recession in 2008, 
during which demand for legal services cratered and thousands of lawyers 
were fired.20 
This essay argues that the modern American legal profession began in the 
aftermath of the ABA’s adoption of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.  Of course, much of the work of lawyers has remained 
unchanged for well over a century.  Lawyers continue to represent clients in 
trials as zealous advocates in civil and criminal cases.  Lawyers prepare 
documents to facilitate real estate transactions, draft wills and trust 
documents, organize and counsel corporations or other business entities, 
spearhead re-organization efforts in bankruptcy courts, and assist clients 
before administrative agencies.  What has changed in the American legal 
profession over the past half-century is best summarized as the solution and 
problem of “scale.” 
The compounded demand for legal services by corporations from the late 
1960s was fueled by the adoption of ever-more complex laws, which applied 
to ever greater social domains.  The generation of new legal problems in 
applying the law to the actions of private actors often required innovative 
 
18. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 5–6 (2015) (noting divergence since the 1960s in income pattern for law firm 
partners and sole practitioners); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 160 (2005) (observing correlation of lawyer’s clients with lawyer income); 
Don J. DeBenedictis, Firings to Continue, ABA J., Mar. 1992, at 24, 24 (reporting firing of associates and 
partners during recession of 1991–1992); see generally Michael Ariens, Ethics in the Legal Industry, 
51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 673 (2018) (discussing economics of the legal profession from the 1980s to 
the Great Recession).  
19. See Galanter, supra note 17, at  1383 (charting the increasing amounts lawyers receive from 
business entities). 
20. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 
2051 n.3 (2010) (noting 5,632 lawyers and 8,715 staff members fired from large law firms from 2008 
through January 2010); see also Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives 
on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (noting many fired 
“staff” included lawyers as well as nonlawyers). 
4
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solutions.  This demand-side need led law firms, particularly those serving 
corporations, to open new practice areas and lawyers to define more 
narrowly their particular expertise.  Large law firms concluded they needed 
to grow at a quickened pace in order to meet the needs of their present and 
future corporate clients.  Scale was thus intended in part to solve the 
problem of  increased demand for legal services by corporate clients.  Scale, 
in terms of size and specialty, was also intended to provide firms a 
competitive edge in an era of increased competition among legal service 
providers.21  Thus, size mattered.  A competitive advantage would offer 
some protection in law firm pricing, and thus in lawyer-partner profits and 
income.  A firm marketing its expertise specific to the needs of a prospective 
client might claim the likelihood of excellent results at an efficient cost.  This 
idea was not new in the early 1970s.22  However, the increased demand for 
an ever-widening array of legal services has led lawyers and firms to claim 
more particular specialties.23  The scale of specialization has also affected 
how lawyers signal their particular expertise.24 
The solution of scale has generated unintended problems.  For example, 
specialization frayed the already loose ties among lawyers in firms (especially 
large firms) and strengthened the bonds between lawyers and clients.25  The 
corporate need for often-mutating, specialized legal services has led large 
law firms to grow much more quickly than the profession overall, and to see 
growth as the solution to competition.26  The intense focus on growth to 
protect profits per partner reoriented the way in which lawyers understood 
 
21. See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. 1003, 1058 
n.313 (1994) (noting increased competition among law firms). 
22. See id. at 1009 (“In the 1960s, the pressure to permit recognition of specialties 
intensified . . . .  By the end of the 1970s, the ABA adopted a Model Plan of Specialization . . . .”). 
23. See id. at 1038 (“[T]he most significant fact about the modern metropolitan bar was that it 
had moved mass-wise out of court work, out of a general practice akin to that of the family doctor, 
into highly paid specialization in the service of large corporations.” (quoting K.N. Llewellyn, The Bar 
Specializes—With What Results?, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 177, 177 (1933))). 
24. One example is the 2018 Best Lawyers Texas survey, an annual special advertising supplement 
to the Dallas Morning News and the Houston Chronicle, which recognizes peer-evaluated experts in 145 
practice areas, including “Energy Regulatory Law,” a category distinct from “Energy Law,” 
“Biotechnology and Life Sciences Practice,” and “Corporate Governance and Compliance Law.”  2018 
Survey Results Texas, BEST LAW., May 31, 2018, at 8, 8–12.  
25. See Ariens, supra note 21, at 1038 (contemplating the observation of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. that 
specialization turned the lawyer from a public-minded actor to one whose “private stock in trade 
[could] be exploited for his private benefit” (quoting A.A. Berle, Jr., Modern Legal Profession, in 
9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 340, 344 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1933))). 
26. See id. at 1035 (observing the swift growth of firms due to the evolution of specialization). 
5
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the purpose of their work.  Lawyers have turned from the view that the 
practice of law embeds ideals of professionalism to the view that the practice 
of law is just another industry in which profits are to be maximized.27  The 
former emphasizes the limits of the market on the actions of lawyers.  The 
latter focuses relentlessly on competitive economic advantages.  The focus 
on competitive advantage has led law firms to embrace scale.  It is also why 
growth among large law firms over the past forty years has become an end 
in and of itself.  Size allows law firms to present to corporate clients the 
claim that they can perform any legal (and law-related) task. 
The emphasis on growth has had its own concussive effects.  Finding 
lawyers who possess expertise demanded by clients has fostered the rise of 
law firm mergers28 and lateral hiring,29 particularly of “rainmaker” 
partners.30  Rainmakers demanded massive pay packages.  Those income 
guarantees must be paid by someone, and often that someone was a partner 
who was less economically valuable to the firm.31  Those valued less were 
shown the door, made income-only partners, or had their income slashed.  
The rise of the rainmaker era of the 1970s and 1980s was a drastic change 
from the 1960s.32  And as large law firms competed against one another 
exclusively on the metric of profits per partner, associates looked to obtain 
their share in the form of higher pay.33  Because growth was tied to strength, 
and strength to firm value to the client, large firms showed their financial 
 
27. See William D. Henderson, Rise and Fall, AM. LAW., June 2014, at 56 (noting sole metric of 
success in large law firms has been profit-maximization); see also Ariens, supra note 18 (discussing 
economics of the legal profession from the 1980s to the Great Recession). 
28. See Leslie A. Gordon, Make Me a Match, ABA J., June 2017, at 49, 50 (discussing law firm 
mergers). 
29. An early example is explored in Steven K. Brill, Building a Law Firm—Fast, ESQUIRE, 
May 23, 1978, at 10, 11.  See also KIM ISAAC EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE 
COLLAPSE OF FINLEY KUMBLE, ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST LAW FIRMS 192 (1990) (recounting 
rise and fall of large firm built on hiring lateral partners). 
30. Rainmaker, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A lawyer who generates a large 
amount of business for a law firm”).  The word is traced to 1971.  Id. 
31. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 58 (1964) (noting challenges that arise 
when incorporating new legal talent). 
32. See id. (noting value and attention given to young new hires over older partners); PAUL 
HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS 
59 (1973) (“As the client becomes institutionalized, he’s less subject to the control of one man, and as 
a firm grows, the rainmaker’s value is reduced.”). 
33. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 20, at  20–21 (noting new associate pay over time). 
6
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strength by matching the highest salary offer made to any new associate.34  
Increased costs meant higher bills for clients.  Both hourly billing rates and 
minimum annual billable hour requirements rose to pay for a more 
expensive cost structure.35  That rise meant less time for partners or other 
experienced lawyers to mentor new and junior associates (and less time for 
the associates to be mentored).  Increased costs also meant increased 
borrowing by large law firms.  When the economy would sour, indebted law 
firms went broke.  When the economy really soured in 2008, more firms 
dissolved.  Over two dozen law firms went bankrupt from the mid-1980s to 
the present, including eighteen from 2008–2012.36 
Scale remains the dominant response to competition in the modern era.  
Watergate affected the psychology of the legal profession, and had some 
effect concerning the manner in which lawyers perceived their duties to 
clients and to society.37  It was not, however, the catalyst of modernization.  
Modernization was nourished by a turn to maximizing lawyer income, in 
light of the economically challenging times after Watergate through about 
1983.38  Economically challenging times drew lawyers closer to their clients 
and away from the idea that they acted as social trustees as well as private 
sellers of legal services.39  This appears especially the case for lawyers and 
law firms that represent corporations, who are the clear economic winners 
in the modern legal profession. 
The larger profession’s desire to maximize income has been a dominant 
but not uniform theme among modern lawyers.  Many lawyers and judges 
have attacked the privatization model with a call for a return to, or 
 
34. See id. at 20 (explaining a continuing pattern of large firms matching the highest salary offer 
made to new associates); Sara Randazzo, Starting Law Firm Associate Salaries Hit $190,000, WALL ST. J. 
(June 12, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/starting-law-firm-associate-salaries-hit-
190-000-1528813210?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4 [https://perma.cc/6UJM-EDTV]. 
35. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 20, at 24 (highlighting pressure on partners to bill more). 
36. See Richard L. Wynne et al., 21st Annual Bankruptcy Battleground West: Concurrent 
Session: Law Firm Insolvencies from Finley to Dewey: What Have We Learned? (Am. Bankr. Inst. 
Mar. 22, 2013)  (listing notable law firms that underwent dissolution or insolvency from 1996–2012). 
37. See Ariens, supra note 9, at 591 (describing a shared sense of shame among establishment 
lawyers post-Watergate and the resulting confusion lawyers faced in balancing their client’s interest 
with public interest). 
38. Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism, 
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 689, 735 (2016). 
39. See generally Michael Ariens, The Rise and Fall of Social Trustee Professionalism, 2016 J. PROF. 
LAW. 49, 88 (tracing the history of the private lawyer perception of duty to serve both client and 
society). 
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acknowledgment of, the legal profession’s duty to act as professionals, as 
engaged in more than a business.40  The professionalism movement was 
triggered in 198341 and continues through the present.  The movement 
serves as a modest, but helpful, check on the dominant view that the only 
metric that counts is profits.  A second segment of the profession rejected 
the privatization model altogether; though a small part of the legal 
profession, public interest lawyers who worked in government and non-
profit law firms, used purpose, not profits, as their metric of success.  They 
have outperformed their numbers in achieving success.42  Public interest 
lawyers, though splintered in defining the interest of the public, have 
proliferated and are now a presence in many cases requiring interpretation 
of the Constitution and major legislation.  They are an integral part of the 
rights revolution, which began in the 1960s but flowered during the next 
decade. 
These modern times are marked by both a greater professionalization and 
de-professionalization among lawyers.  American legal institutions have 
emphasized the ideological duty and economic necessity of lawyers to 
continue to develop their professional skills.  Many lawyers demonstrate 
technical excellence in an extraordinary range of legal subjects.43  This 
excellence in lawyering has come at an unusual cost: a shift in power from 
lawyer to client in fields in which excellence is demanded.  The increasing 
number of superbly skilled lawyers has expanded clients’ options in 
employing legal counsel.  To make themselves attractive to such clients, 
these lawyers need to signal their effectiveness as much if not more so than 
their expertise.  Over the past forty years, lawyers have positioned 
themselves in the legal services market in ways that have generated shifts in 
 
40. See Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Lawyer’s Obligation to the Public Interest, in THE LAWYER’S 
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN IDEAL REVISITED 11 (John B. Davidson ed., 1985) (making the 
argument for lawyers to practice law as public servants); see generally TORT & INS. PRACTICE SECTION, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE 
CHALLENGES (John B. Davidson ed., 1985) (presenting articles from the 1983 Annual Meeting of the 
ABA’s Tort and Insurance Practice Section attacking commercialism in the practice of law). 
41. See Ariens, supra note 39, at 49–52 (tracing the history of the professionalism movement). 
42. See Ariens, supra note 9, at 597 (identifying public interest lawyers as a “distinctive subsets 
of the lawyer population” that served outside the private realm). 
43. See 2018 Survey Results Texas, supra note 24, at 8–12 (categorizing Texas’s top lawyers into 
145 specialized practice areas, such as “Eminent Domain and Condemnation Law,” “Information 
Technology Law,” and “Railroad Law”). 
 
8
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss2/4
  
2019] MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 679 
the structure of private law firms.44  Those signals to current and 
prospective clients have lessened the ties of a number of large law firms to 
traditional professional norms.  One consequence of this greater attention 
to signaling clients is that fewer lawyers at such firms have taken leadership 
roles in mandatory and voluntary bar associations and other legal 
institutions since the late 1970s.45  The fragmenting of professional 
institutional ties also made the efforts to attract and keep clients ever more 
business-like.  The competition for lucrative legal work helped further 
privatize the work of private practice lawyers, and to make lawyers less 
inclined to perceive their work as possessing a social component.46  This 
de-professionalization change largely occurred in the relationship between 
lawyers and sophisticated clients. 
Lawyers representing individuals have also found an economic need to 
enhance their superior legal skills.47  This is particularly important in high-
value personal injury matters and among those engaged in major felony 
criminal defense cases.  The emphasis on technical expertise is also found 
in much of the public interest pro bono sector, as litigation success can be 
used to assist fundraising.48 
A continued failure among American lawyers is in using scale to provide 
legal services to the broad middle class.49  The cost of legal services 
continues to rise;50 technological advances have not given those of modest 
 
44. See Ariens, supra note 9, at 581 (“Finally, it suggests how the confluence of both material 
and ideological concerns in the American legal profession in the 1970s privatized the public mission 
of private practice lawyers.”). 
45. See Ariens, supra note 39, at 88 (identifying “well-connected, large firm lawyers” were no 
longer “at the top of the ABA” once the profession began to shift toward privatization). 
46. See id. (“The profession’s negative reaction to the proposals of the Kutak Commission made 
it clear that social trustee professionalism no longer commanded even the formal or symbolic deference 
of a large number of lawyers.”); Ariens, supra note 9, at  594–97 (pointing to a precarious economic 
climate as the reason many private practice lawyers found “it difficult to pledge fidelity to the ideal that 
law was a public profession and they were social engineers or officers of the court”). 
47. See Ariens, supra note 9, at  597  (identifying specialization “as essential to the public mission 
of lawyers, especially those serving individuals”). 
48. See Ariens, supra note 38, at 732–33  (noting liberal public interest groups “are, in fact, special 
interest groups and no different from . . . attempts to lobby public opinion and garner governmental 
support for a particular cause”). 
49. See BARTON, supra note 18, at  7 (discussing the financial difficulty both middle- and low-
income Americans have in retaining an attorney). 
50. See GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 2018 REPORT 
ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 7 chart 6 (2018) (noting the increase in billable rates from 
2007 through November 2017). 
9
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means sufficient access to estate planning, family law, and representation in 
civil cases unrelated to personal injuries.  Further, the profession has failed 
to reach its professional ideals in the vast majority of cases in which lawyers 
represent indigent families and those accused of crimes.51   
Scale has also affected the structure of smaller corporate law firms.  One 
approach taken by these firms was to opt out of the growth paradigm by 
serving clients at a lower price point.52  A second was to shift from billable 
hour fee arrangements to alternative fee structures (sometimes called value 
billing) designed for the mutual benefit of the client and firm.53  These 
approaches might mean giving any surplus value to clients, leaving the law 
firm partners with lower profits or paying less to associates than the largest 
law firms.  It often meant both.  Smaller firms might justify these responses 
as signaling a cultural advantage in the market for lawyers.  The signals might 
also include making partners of a higher percentage of associates, 
particularly profit-participating partners, lessening the length of time 
necessary to achieve partner status, or by giving associates a richer, more 
qualitatively valuable experience serving corporate clients.  A third approach 
was to signal expertise to clients by stringently limiting the firm’s claim.54  
These boutique firms claimed equivalent or higher skills and knowledge at 
a lower cost to clients, in part due to a leaner cost structure.55 
Scale also affected personal injury firms.  Before the Supreme Court held 
in 1977, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,56 that truthful commercial advertising 
by lawyers was constitutionally protected,57 lawyers could ethically signal their 
 
51. See Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of 
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 227 (1973) (addressing “the need 
for skilled courtroom advocacy with a special emphasis on the administration of criminal justice”). 
52. See generally Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services 
Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 59 (2012) (“Recent years have seen franchise-level lawyers depart large 
firms to create new firms with alternative billing and organizational models.”). 
53. See MITCHELL KOWALSKI, AVOIDING EXTINCTION: REIMAGINING LEGAL SERVICES 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 132 (2012) (opting to use the term “value-based billing” instead of 
“alternative billing” because the former conveys to clients that “charges are based on value”); 
Campbell, supra note 52, at 59–61 (discussing the emergence of alternative billing structures in 
corporate law firms). 
54. See Sander & Williams, supra note 14, at 474 (identifying specialty firms as signaling eliteness 
to clients). 
55. See Burk & McGowan, supra note 20, at  5–7 (noting how a leaner cost structure enables 
boutique firms to claim specialty skills and knowledge at a lower client cost). 
56. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
57. Id. at 382–83. 
10
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expertise to prospective clients through specialization certification 
programs,58 or through free media when their cases made news.  Personal 
injury lawyers took marketing to new levels, moving from advertisements in 
the body of the Yellow Pages, to buying its back cover, to radio and 
television commercials, to today’s massive digital marketing campaigns.  
This scaling generated an institutionalization of personal injury law firms, in 
terms of increasing lawyer and nonlawyer staff, in opening branches across 
a state, and in longevity, as some personal injury firms have survived their 
founder’s death.59  Scale also touched on segments of personal injury law 
in the increased use of the class action lawsuit,60 the rise of mass tort 
litigation,61 and third-party litigation financing.62 
 
58. See Ariens, supra note 21, at 1054  (“Both [California’s and Texas’s lawyer specialization 
programs] were premised on the assumption that certification of specialists protected the public 
interest by ensuring the competence of lawyers.”). 
59. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN 
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 5 (1991) (“Personal injury litigation, long one of the more 
marginal and ethically problematic areas of legal practice, was first to be transformed.  The rags-to-
riches story of malpractice lawsuits is by now familiar.”). 
60. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 736–39 (2013) 
(characterizing courts’ increasing receptiveness in the mid-1980s to upholding class actions under 
Rule 23 as a necessary response intended to unclog their dockets of mass torts and personal injury 
cases); see generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ironic History of Rule 23, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Aug. 10, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3020306 [https://perma.cc/L64W-8HZJ] (discussing the history of 
class actions after the 1966 passage of modern Rule 23). 
61. See PATRICK DILLON & CARL M. CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED: THE SPECTACULAR RISE 
AND FALL OF THE LAWYER WHO BROUGHT CORPORATE AMERICA TO ITS KNEES 3 (2010) 
(describing one lawyer’s contribution to mass tort litigation); ALAN LANGE & TOM DAWSON, KINGS 
OF TORT: THE TRUE STORY OF DICKIE SCRUGGS, PAUL MINOR, AND TWO DECADES OF POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL MANIPULATION IN MISSISSIPPI 27 (2010) (describing how a personal injury lawyer 
consolidated thousands of asbestos-related claims in a state that did not authorize class-action lawsuits); 
CURTIS WILKIE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF AMERICA’S MOST 
POWERFUL TRIAL LAWYER 45 (2010) (discussing an attorney’s ability to bring hundreds of asbestos 
claims to court). 
62. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Control, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2939, 2939 (2014) (noting “a marked increase in frivolous and/or socially unproductive 
litigation” due to plaintiffs’ attorneys view of litigation as an investment).  The most well-known and 
controversial case of third-party financing is Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, in which Peter Thiel secretly 
funded Terry Bollea’s (more popularly known as “Hulk Hogan’s”) invasion of privacy lawsuit against 
Gawker when the latter posted parts of a sex tape involving Bollea, made without Bollea’s knowledge.  
See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1326–27 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (denying injunctive 
relief for copyright infringement based on the release of Terry Bollea’s sex tape); see also RYAN 
HOLIDAY, CONSPIRACY: PETER THIEL, HULK HOGAN, GAWKER, AND THE ANATOMY OF 
INTRIGUE 195 (2018) (highlighting the high costs associated with the litigation). 
11
Ariens: Modern American Legal Profession, 1969–Present
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
682 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:671 
Technology has also created an informational scaling that has altered the 
profession.  From LexisNexis and Westlaw to HeinOnline, Fastcase and 
other legal information providers, cases, statutes, regulations, and other legal 
information are now available to lawyers at a relatively low price.  The 
knowledge premium once enjoyed by large law firms with in-house libraries 
(and librarians) is dissipated, if not extinct.63  Technological advances have 
disproportionately benefited the small-firm lawyer.  Legal tools available 
from Internet-based sites, such as Rocket Lawyer and LegalZoom, may 
adversely affect the economic prospects of the solo practitioner and small-
firm lawyer, though that is yet unproven.  The lower cost of legal 
information may benefit both lawyers and their prospective clients.  
However, the challenge in providing such services to a broader segment of 
society continues, and it is not yet clear how such services may be provided 
at a price that is profitable and affordable.64 
II.    THE ROAD TO MODERNITY 
During the two decades between the end of World War II and Lewis 
Powell’s 1964 proposal to modernize the code of legal ethics, the American 
legal profession consolidated and gained considerable strength and 
distinctive status.65  This was a marked change from the 1930s, when 
lawyers, like many others, suffered during the Great Depression.66  By 1940, 
under the guise of improving the stature of the profession, many bar 
associations had worked assiduously to make admission to the bar more 
difficult.67  Most states had adopted the requirement of three years of full-
time undergraduate education to be eligible to take the bar examination.68  
 
63. See BARTON, supra note 18, at 7 (“An American with a smartphone now has easier access to 
legal sources than most lawyers did in the 1980s . . . .”). 
64. See id. at 25 (noting legal work moves from “bespoke” or tailored work through 
“systematized” and finally work that has become “commoditized”). 
65. See Ariens, supra note 3, at 418–19 (“Lawyers were confident that they had a leading role to 
play in American society, and others told them so.”). 
66. See Ariens, supra note 21, at 1040 (noting the Great Depression’s impact on the nonelite 
lawyer). 
67. See Ariens, supra note 3, at 415 (“By successfully attacking the diploma privilege and 
reducing the passing rate for bar examinees, the annual absolute number of new members of the 
profession declined from 9,860 in 1930 to 7,942 in 1940 . . . .”). 
68. John Kirkland Clark, Standards of Bar Admission, 9 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 177, 178 (1937); 
see also Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American 
Bar Association, 44 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 679, 684 (1921) (noting most states’ requirement of three years 
of undergraduate education to be eligible to sit for the bar examination). 
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This minimized the incentive to choose an apprenticeship rather than law 
school.69  The bar examination also became more difficult to pass.  This 
delayed entry into the profession, as it both shifted many from shorter 
apprenticeships to the three years it took to complete law school, and meant 
those failing the bar exam were delayed in entering the practice of law.70  
Even so, lawyers in the pre-World War II era made regular claims that the 
bar was overcrowded, causing lawyer income to stagnate.71  It was not until 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 that the profession’s 
claims of an overcrowded bar ended as law schools emptied.72 
Bar elites reassessed the position of lawyers in American society shortly 
after the end of World War II.  In 1946 the ABA approved a Survey of the 
Legal Profession.73  By the early 1950s, the Survey had produced over 150 
reports,74 some critical, but mostly positive, concerning the benefits lawyers 
offered in fostering the American democratic experiment.75  One 
prominent example of this view was a 1952 speech praising the work of 
lawyers by the renowned sociologist Talcott Parsons.76 
One challenge to this more favorable view of lawyers in the early 1950s 
was Red-baiting.  Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed that 
Communists had invaded crucial government positions.77  Those accused 
of joining, or harboring sympathy toward the Communist Party, often found 
 
69. By 1947, fifteen jurisdictions prohibited apprenticeships.  ROBERT STEVENS, LAW 
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 217 n.9 (1983). 
70. See Ariens, supra note 3, at 415  (noting decline in bar passage during the Great Depression). 
71. The Special Committee on the Economic Condition of the Bar of the ABA was created in 
1937.  It was disbanded by the ABA in 1945.  Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 70 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 
101, 119 (1945). 
72. See Statistical Information on Enrollments, 1944 A.A.L.S. PROC. 105, 105 (highlighting law school 
enrollment decline from 18,011 in 1940 to 3,663 in 1943). 
73. Proceedings of the 1946 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 71 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 307, 308 
(1946). 
74. Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession: Its Scope, Methods and Objectives, 39 A.B.A. 
J. 548, 550 (1953). 
75. Compare Robert T. McCracken, Report of Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 
37 VA. L. REV. 399, 425 (1951) (concluding lawyers have adopted “a strict observance of the ethics 
standards”), with ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A 
STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT 20 (1952) (suggesting a re-
affirmation of Canons of Ethics to emphasize its “significance”). 
76. Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY 371–72 (3d ed. 1963) (reprinting Parsons’ December 4, 1952 speech given at the University 
of Chicago). 
77. See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF 
AMERICA, 1932–1972, at 868, 877 (1974) (offering a popular history of the Army-McCarthy hearings). 
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it difficult to obtain legal representation when they were fired from their 
jobs or were otherwise subjected to legal harm.78  A faction of elite law firm 
lawyers responded to McCarthy’s Red-baiting by managing to get the ABA 
to create a Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National 
Security.79  The elite Association of the Bar of the City of New York also 
joined in defending lawyers who represented those accused of having ties to 
Communists.80  This elite group then promoted the rule of law ideal that 
every accused person enjoyed the right to the assistance of counsel.81  Those 
lawyers also managed to get a reluctant ABA House of Delegates to approve 
a resolution declaring “the duty of the bar to provide such aid [representing 
persons accused of crimes] even to the most unpopular defendants.”82 
The ideal view of the lawyer—as a public guardian who resolutely 
defended the oppressed and the outcast—burst forth in nonfiction, fiction, 
plays, and movies in the late 1950s and early 1960s.83  For example, in mid-
1962, the lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, known for his representation of 
Mafiosi, a Communist spy, and even Joe McCarthy, published One Man’s 
Freedom,84 a relatively dry account of American legal values as demonstrated 
by his representation of persons across the political spectrum and even 
those who rejected or otherwise tried to subvert the American system of 
government.  One Man’s Freedom made the weekly New York Times bestseller 
list for four months.85  Other efforts to centralize the law, and thus lawyers, 
to the operation of civil society included the ABA’s successful 1958 effort 
 
78. See Ariens, supra note 39, at 58–61 (discussing the unavailability of counsel to those accused 
of having Communist ties and the potential economic ruin of lawyers willing to represent 
Communists). 
79. See Proceedings of the 1953 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 118, 
133 (1953) (adopting the resolution of the Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by 
National Security, thereby reaffirming the duty of the bar to represent even the most unpopular 
defendants in response to Red-baiting); see also Ariens, supra note 6, at 166–67 (“Working as a ‘lawyer 
for hire’ was . . . how legal elites justified defending committed Communists during the 1950s Red 
Scare.”). 
80. Ariens, supra note 39, at 61. 
81. See Report of the Board of Governors, 77 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 459, 463 (1952) (stating the Board’s 
request that the House of Delegates approve the Special Committee). 
82. Proceedings of the 1953 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 78 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 118, 133 
(1953). 
83. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 142–45 (commenting on the “lionization” of lawyers in the media 
during the 1950s and 1960s). 
84. EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ONE MAN’S FREEDOM 3–4, 11 (1962). 
85. New York Times Best Sellers List, HAWES PUBLICATIONS, (Oct. 28, 1962), 
http://hawes.com/1962/1962-10-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2KV-RNMZ]. 
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making May 1 “Law Day” in the United States.86  A similar effort was the 
ABA’s promotion of World Peace Through Law.87 
Society’s relatively positive view of lawyers was eventually accompanied 
by a rise in lawyer income, as the demand for legal services outstripped the 
supply of lawyers.88  In the late 1950s, the ABA began a successful campaign 
to add to its membership.89  One important interest of those new members 
was to increase their income.90  ABA leadership highlighted the “problem” 
of stagnant lawyer income, initially, by printing and widely distributing a 
pamphlet entitled The 1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar.91  The ABA 
followed with additional pamphlets suggesting approaches to increasing 
income.  It also created a Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice 
with “the duty of laying the groundwork for the development of practical 
suggestions to lawyers designed to improve their economic status[.]”92  This 
Committee was sufficiently important to become an ABA Standing 
Committee in 1961.93  In the mid-1960s, the ABA Journal began publishing 
an annual column discussing the federal government’s report on lawyer 
income.94  These columns showed steady, better-than-inflation increases 
 
86. Law Day was created by the ABA and first promulgated by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1958.  See The President’s Proclamation, 44 A.B.A. J. 343, 343 (1958) (approving 
May 1st as Law Day); see also Jason Krause, Charlie Rhyne’s Big Idea, ABA J., May 2008, at 65, 65 (crediting 
ABA President Charlie Rhyne with creating Law Day); Law Day, in OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN LAW 491 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002) (accounting how Law Day was established in 
the United States). 
87. The ABA’s World Peace Through Law initiative was also created in 1958.  Charles S. Rhyne, 
World Peace Through Law, 83 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 624, 638 (1958). 
88. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 160 (1989) (discussing the history of the 
economic status of American lawyers). 
89. William C. Farrer, Our Younger Lawyers, 42 A.B.A. J. 575, 575 (1956). 
90. See Report of the Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 83 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 434, 435 
(1958) (highlighting data compiled through a survey of state bar associations). 
91. SPECIAL COMM. ON ECON. OF LAW PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE 1958 LAWYER AND 
HIS 1938 DOLLAR (1958). 
92. Report of the Special Committee on Economics of Law Practice, 83 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 434, 435 
(1958). 
93. See Proceedings of the 1961 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 86 A.B.A. ANN REP. 351, 
362–63 (1961) (noting The Economics of Law Practice Committee’s ascension to Standing 
Committee).  Its Chairman for the 1961–62 year was Lewis F. Powell, Jr.  Id. at 383 
94. John D. Conner & N. S. Clifton, Income of Lawyers, 1961–1962, 51 A.B.A. J. 753, 753 (1965); 
Cullen Smith & N. S. Clifton, Income of Lawyers, 1962–1963, 52 A.B.A. J. 1043, 1043 (1966). 
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for lawyers.95  Again, the increase in demand for legal services outstripped 
supply during the 1950s and 1960s.96  By the time Lewis F. Powell called 
for a new code of legal ethics, lawyer income was a diminishing issue among 
ABA members.  In 1969, the median income of lawyers had risen to $47,638 
(in 1983 dollars), a doubling in real income in twenty years.97 
These salad days quickly ended as the economy slowed in the 1970s, and 
lawyers by 1973 once again complained about an overcrowded profession 
and an absence of jobs for new lawyers to fill.98  These complaints occurred 
even as law schools set attendance records.99  The ABA’s consultant on 
legal education noted that during the fall of 1973, “[F]or the first time, there 
was not a single ‘unfilled seat’ in the first-year class of any approved law 
school.”100 
III.    MODERN TIMES 
A. Economics and Structure 
In August 1963, then-former Vice President and failed presidential and 
gubernatorial candidate Richard M. Nixon joined the New York law firm of 
Mudge, Rose, Guthrie & Alexander, becoming its lead named partner in 
early 1964.101  The firm immediately prospered.  Its partners increased their 
billing hours from 857 hours in 1963 (down from 929 hours in 1962) to 
1,119 in 1964 and 1,251 in 1965.102  Its revenues rose 25% in 1964, from 
 
95. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 51, 63–64 (noting lawyers’ actual earnings were greater than expected in the 1960s and 
early 1970s). 
96. Id. at 72; see ABEL, supra note 88, at 160 (discussing economics of legal profession in post-
World War II era). 
97. Sander & Williams, supra note 14, at 448–49. 
98. See Report of the Task Force on Professional Utilization, 97 A.B.A. ANN REP. 818, 819 (1972) 
(“The American Bar Association’s Task Force on Professional Utilization was formed . . . to review 
data with respect to the increase in the number of new entrants into the profession . . . .”) (quoting the 
Board of Governors)); see also ABEL, supra note 88, at 160 (noting declining job prospects and pay for 
lawyers during the early 1970s due to expansion of the profession in the face of a recession). 
99. See James P. White, Is That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A. J. 202, 202 
(1975) (observing an increase in law school enrollment between 1973 and 1974). 
100. Id.  White also noted that first-year fall 1974 enrollment indicated “only one law school 
reported ‘unfilled seats’ in its entering class.”  Id. 
101. VICTOR LI, NIXON IN NEW YORK: HOW WALL STREET HELPED RICHARD NIXON WIN 
THE WHITE HOUSE 75 (2018); Victor Li, Nixon in New York, ABA J., May 2018, at 47, 47. 
102. LI, supra note 101, at 75; Li, supra note 101, at 47. 
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$2.6 million to $3.5 million.  Revenues rose another 8% in 1965, to $3.8 
million.103 
Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm that provided the above 
information to Richard Nixon, undertook a larger study for the ABA’s 
Standing Committee on Economics of Law Practice.104  The study found 
that the range of collectible billable hours for associates was between 1,400 
and 1,600 hours, or twenty-eight to thirty-two hours per week stretched 
across fifty weeks.105  The billable hour range for law firm partners was 
1,200 to 1,400.106  This work schedule was common.  A late 1950s study 
concluded that the most hours a lawyer could bill was between 1,200 and 
1,500.107  A memoir by an Atlanta lawyer notes that, as an associate of a 
corporate law firm, he billed 1,300 hours in 1964, and that many “partners 
under the age of sixty billed fewer than one thousand hours a year, and some 
only a few hundred.  In fact, no one was counting.”108  A well-known 1959 
article by Harvard Law School Professor Henry Hart declared that the 
members of the Supreme Court were unable to take on any more cases 
because they lacked the time.109  He calculated the Justices could give 1,728 
hours annually to the matters before the Court.110 
The ABA’s entreaty to lawyers that they log the number of hours spent 
on their clients’ matters in order to increase their income led to an emphasis 
by the early 1970s on collecting fees through the billable hour.111  Many 
private practice lawyers then began to rely solely on the number of billable 
hours expended to justify their fee. That is, the number of hours, not the 
 
103. Li, supra note 101, at 47. 
104. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY 
ATTORNEYS 2 (1996) (analyzing “[a] study prepared for the ABA by two Price Waterhouse 
accountants”). 
105. Id. at 2–3. 
106. Id. at 3. 
107. Id. at 19–20. 
108. MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 6 (1997).  Trotter also noted that lawyers “routinely” worked “eight to nine hours 
a day, five days a week and half a day or more on Saturday,” and their families complained they were 
never home.  Id. at 5. 
109. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 84 (1959) 
(“[T]he Court has more work to do than it is able to do in the way in which the work ought to be 
done.”). 
110. Id. at 86. 
111. See ROSS, supra note 104, at 19 (exploring the debate surrounding the appropriate method 
of billing by lawyers in the early 1970s). 
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result accomplished, became the basis for the bill to the client.112  The 
metric of the billable hour, initially proposed to aid both clients and lawyers, 
was used more for the financial benefit of lawyers than their clients.  
Severing the fee from the client’s goal provided an incentive for lawyers to 
bill as many hours as the client would be willing to bear. 
Once lawyers (and clients) agreed to measure the fee by the number of 
hours worked, lawyers reconsidered how many hours a lawyer could work 
on client matters.  By the 1980s, many if not most law firms with corporate 
clients had steadily raised the number of hours a lawyer was required to bill.  
In the early 1980s, the standard annual billing requirement in Washington, 
D.C. was 1,800 hours.  This increased to 1,900 hours in 1986.113  By the 
mid-1990s, the number of hours billed by law firm associates and partners 
had risen in large metropolitan areas from 1,649 (Boston) to 1,907 (Atlanta) 
for the former, and from 1,513 (Indianapolis) to 1,847 (Houston) for the 
latter.114  In 2007, just before the Great Recession, the average number of 
billable hours worked by all lawyers was 1,608.115 
In 1972, President Richard Nixon won re-election in a landslide.  One of 
the beneficiaries of Nixon’s victories in 1968 and 1972 was his former law 
firm—Mudge, Rose.116  A survey of the largest law firms in the United 
States published in January 1972 listed Mudge, Rose as the twenty-first 
largest law firm in the United States, with 118 lawyers, divided between 39 
partners and 79 associates.117  The largest American law firm was Baker & 
McKenzie, with 240 lawyers.118 
In 2009, when over 5,000 lawyers were shed from large law firms, Baker 
& McKenzie remained the largest law firm in the National Law Journal’s NLJ 
 
112. See id. (discussing the economic pressures motivating the shift to detailed accounting of all 
time worked by attorneys). 
113. This was my experience as an associate in a Washington, D.C. law firm.  In 1986, the New 
York firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore increased the starting pay of associates from $48,000 to 
$65,000.  In order to come within range of that figure (and corresponding amounts for associates with 
greater experience), the number of billable hours was raised.  In other words, associates paid for their 
own raise. 
114. ROSS, supra note 104, at 3. 
115. See generally GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra 
note 50, at 6 (noting in Chart 5 a slight reduction of thirteen billable hours between 2007 and 2017). 
116. See LI, supra note 101, at 291–316 (detailing how various post-Mudge, Rose staffers filled 
in Nixon’s administration). 
117. Alexis de Tocqueville, Money Talks: Why It Shouts to Some Lawyers and Whispers to Others, 
2 JURIS DOCTOR, Jan. 1972, at 55, 56. 
118. Id. 
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250, with 3,949 lawyers.119  The smallest of the NLJ 250 counted 164 
lawyers, nearly 50 lawyers less than reported by the now-defunct Mudge, 
Rose.120  The number of American lawyers rose from 358,520 in 1972 to 
1,180,386 in 2009, about a 230% increase.121  Baker & McKenzie grew 
1,600%.122  Large law firms have grown exponentially in the modern era.  
As early as 1987, the median number of lawyers in the largest law firms was 
460.123 
Large law firm partners have also noted that their income rises as the ratio 
of associates to partners increases.  This scaling has been combined with 
another form of scaling: these firms have reduced the percentage of 
associates in favor of using “a greater proportion of lower-cost 
temporary/contract lawyers and permanent, non-partner track lawyers.”124  
The 1972 survey of the largest law firms showed that, outside of New York 
City-based law firms, the ratio of associates to partners averaged about 1.5 
to 1.125  Indeed, two firms listed more partners than associates.126  The 
2018 national ratio (which is always less than the ratio of the largest law 
firms) has been about 2.2 to 1 for the past decade.127 
Scaling has also distinguished the most profitable firms and highest-
revenue generating firms from all others.  The 2017 American Lawyer 
AmLaw 100 survey reported the three largest firms accounted for 10% of 
 
119. Leigh Jones, So Long, Farewell; There’s No Sugar Coating It: This Was the Worst Year  
Ever for Lawyer Headcount, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 9, 2009, at S–4, https://advance.lexis.com/api/
permalink/65e55239-18ff-4358-a5cd-2ec41dfb7649/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/BQZ5-
3BE2]. 
120. Id.; cf. Carey Goldberg, The Mudge Rose Firm Enters the Tar Pit of Legal History, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 1, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/01/nyregion/the-mudge-rose-firm-enters-the-
tar-pit-of-legal-history.html [https://perma.cc/SU46-4TYK]. 
121. ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/market_research/Total_National_Lawyer_Population_1878-2018.authcheck 
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ6K-XNZT]. 
122. De Tocqueville, supra note 117, at 55, 56; Jones, supra note 119. 
123. ABEL, supra note 88, at 311. 
124. HILDEBRANDT CONSULTING LLC & CITI PRIVATE BANK, 2017 CLIENT ADVISORY 3 
(2017), http://www.hildebrandtconsult.com/uploads/2017_Citi_Hildebrandt_Client_Advisory.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/362W-WMCT]. 
125. De Tocqueville, supra note 117, at 56. 
126. See id. (noting associate-to-partner ratios). 
127. GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 50, 
at 10. 
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the revenue of all 100 firms, and the 9 largest firms accounted for 25% of 
all revenue.128 
Additionally, it is rare for a large law firm to exist in one location, as firms 
merge and as lateral partners are added.  For example, the venerable 
Houston, Texas law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski129 merged with the 
London-based firm Norton Rose to form Norton Rose Fulbright in 
2013.130  The firm then merged with New York-based Chadbourne & Parke 
in 2017, creating a firm of about 4,000 lawyers.131  Those lawyers are 
scattered across about fifty cities across the globe. 
With 4,000 lawyers it is impossible to know your partners, much less what 
they are doing.  This makes unenviable the general partnership business 
model, given every partner’s unlimited liability for the professional harms 
caused and debts contracted by every other partner.  The modern solution, 
arising “out of the ashes of the savings and loan debacle” of the 1980s, was 
the adoption by state legislatures of limited liability entities for law firms.132  
The debacle included fraud lawsuits filed by the federal government against 
lawyers who represented savings and loan clients.133  The partners of those 
lawyers were, under general partnership law, also subject to liability.  In 
1991, Texas adopted the first limited liability law partnership statute.134  
This protected law firm partners from malpractice claims.  Other states 
extended the liability protections available to law firm partners in a limited 
liability partnership (LLP).  Many states broadened the vicarious liability 




128. Id. at 12. 
129. JOHN H. CROOKER, JR. & GIBSON GAYLE, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI: 75 YEARS  
(1919–1974) (1994). 
130. Our History, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/K432-SRAM]. 
131. Id. 
132. Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Related to Limited Liability Law 
Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 399, 400 (1998); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield 
of Unintended Consequences—The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 720 
(1997) [hereinafter Fortney, Seeking Shelter] (discussing the rush by law firms to limit liability by 
organizing as LLCs). 
133. See Fortney, Seeking Shelter, supra note 132, at 718–20 (articulating the fallout from the 
“savings and loan debacle” on law firms and attorneys). 
134. See id. at 725 (noting the creation of limited liability law firm partnerships in Texas; see also 
id. at 725 n.36 (“Within two years of the enactment of the Texas LLP legislation, 569 Texas firms 
elected LLP status.”). 
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from vicarious liability for contract claims.135 
The limited liability entity protected lawyers from bearing the financial 
consequences of the misdeeds of their fellow “partners.”  The nagging 
question was, what benefit from these entities did the clients of the law firm 
receive?  Although the Texas statute provided that LLPs must obtain liability 
insurance,136 the agreed-upon amount was “an arbitrary and admittedly 
often inadequate amount of $100,000.”137  That question nagged because 
every answer seemed to begin with “less than before.” 
The rise of limited liability law partnerships implicitly acknowledged not 
only the immense growth of law firms but the spread of such firms to a 
number of states (and nations).138  The multijurisdictional practice of law 
presented several issues concerning place and the practice of law.139  
American lawyers, of course, receive a license to practice law in a state.  They 
are assumed to know all of the law of that state.  By virtue of obtaining a 
license to practice law in a state, lawyers are eligible to obtain a license to 
practice law in the United States courts with jurisdiction in that state.140  
And those lawyers practicing only federal law (securities, immigration) may 
do so in any location.  Practicing the law of a state outside of a jurisdiction 
from which the lawyer has received a license to practice law is the 
unauthorized practice of law.  Rule 5.5 of the 1983 ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct made it a disciplinary violation for lawyers to practice 
law where unlicensed.141 
Though the nationalization and internationalization of the practice of law 
existed before the 1970s (indeed, some lawyers did so in the 1870s), few 
lawyers practicing law in the early 1970s engaged in the practice of law 
beyond the jurisdiction licensing them.  This began to change during that 
 
135. See id. at 727 (differentiating between LLPs and LLCs and discussing state legislatures’ 
subsequent elimination of the distinction between the two entities). 
136. See id. at 729 n.54 (noting Texas LLP provisions required at least $100,000 of liability 
insurance (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 6132b–45–C(1) (West Supp. 1997))). 
137. See id. at 724–25 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND 
RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 
3 (1995)) (noting the creation of limited liability law firm partnerships in Texas). 
138. See Michael S. Ariens, A Uniform Rule Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys Before 
United States District Courts, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 650 (1986) (“[N]ational legal publications in 1985 
found that 181 of the 250 largest law firms maintained offices in more than one state, and 271 of the 
499 largest law firms maintained interstate offices.” (footnote omitted)). 
139. Id. 
140. See id. at 652–54 (explaining the rules on admission to practice law in federal district courts). 
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b)(1)–(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983). 
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decade, a trend that became clearer soon after the ABA’s 1983 adoption of 
the Model Rules.142 
In 1998, the California Supreme Court held, in Birbrower v. Superior Court 
of Santa Clara County,143 that a New York law firm was not allowed to collect 
a fee for much of its work for its client.144  The client was a New York 
entity with a California subsidiary.  The legal work undertaken by the law 
firm was representing its client in California in an arbitration that involved 
matters of both New York and California law.145  The Court affirmed the 
conclusion that the Birbrower firm had engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law, for none of its lawyers were licensed in California.146  In response, 
the ABA created in 2000 a Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice.147  
The Commission concluded that the ABA should recommend the status 
quo on licensure with some adjustments to admission to practice 
temporarily in a court or in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer was not 
licensed.148  That is, it kept the tie between geography and licensure, even 
as technology was making geography less relevant for many (though not all) 
lawyers.  
The retention of state-based licensing of lawyers is in some tension with 
changes to the bar examination made by many states in the past fifty years.  
In 1972, the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), created by the National 
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), was first administered.149  The 
MBE did not test examinees on the law of any state.  Instead, it tested the 
“majority” view of common law subjects, the common law of crimes, and 
 
142. See id. R. 5.5(c)–(d) (permitting lawyers to practice law in jurisdictions absent a license under 
certain limitations). 
143. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 
949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998). 
144. Id. at 12–13. 
145. Id. at 3. 
146. Id. at 13. 
147. See Report No. 1 of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, 127 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 267, 
267 (2002) (presenting the first report of the Commission advocating for state judicial regulation 
surrounding the practice of law).  The Commission made a total of nine reports to the ABA House of 
Delegates in 2002.  See id. at 267–319 (detailing the recommendations made in the nine reports of the 
ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice). 
148. See id at 270−71 (“[T]he judicial branch of government in each state should identify these 
particular interstate practices, comparable to pro hac vice representation . . . .”). 
149. Michael Ariens, The Ethics of Copyrighting Ethics Rules, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 235, 249–50 
(2005); Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Examination, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 380 
(1996). 
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constitutional law.  The MBE was the initial effort to nationalize the bar 
examination.  The Watergate affair led both to the requirement that law 
schools teach legal ethics and to the creation by the NCBE of the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).150  Both the MBE and 
the MPRE were adopted for use by the vast majority of state boards of law 
examiners.151  The NCBE then created the Multistate Essay Examination 
in 1988.152  It was not as widely adopted.  In 2009, the NCBE crafted the 
Uniform Bar Examination (UBE).  The UBE has been adopted by thirty-
two states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands as of 
October 2018.153  Those jurisdictions that adopt the UBE agree to admit 
to the bar any person who has obtained the state’s required passing score.154  
Though each state board of law examiners chooses its own passing score 
on the UBE, by adopting it that state no longer believes it necessary to test 
its applicants on its actual law.155  Whether passing a state’s bar examination 
actually demonstrated the examinee’s mastery of that state’s law was never 
clearly proven.  However, adoption of the UBE signals the end of any link 
between bar exam success and the examinee’s knowledge of that state’s law.  
The UBE is the equivalent of a national bar examination; testing an idea of 
the law, but not the law as such. 
The multijurisdictional practice debate was indirectly related to another 
effort to transform law firm structure and practice: multidisciplinary practice 
(MDP) by law firms—the idea that nonlawyers could own some part of an 
entity in which the practice of law and other activities (e.g., lobbying, 
compliance, accounting) may occur.156  Rule 5.4 of the ABA’s 1983 Model 
Rules banned ownership of an entity through which the practice of law took 
 
150. See Ariens, supra note 149, at 240 (analyzing the negative impact of the Watergate scandal 
on the legal community). 
151. Id. at 251. 
152. Jarvis, supra note 149, at 383–84. 
153. Adoption of the Uniform Bar Examination, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS 
(Aug. 22, 2018), http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F196 [https://perma 
.cc/8W2L-UQF2].  Several of the thirty-four jurisdictions will administer the UBE for the first time in 
2019.  Id. 
154. Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the UBE, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, 
http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ [https://perma.cc/W5A9-83FB]. 
 155. States are permitted to “assess candidate knowledge of jurisdiction-specific content[.]”  Id.  
However, any effort to use such an assessment to hinder out-of-state candidates would violate the 
UBE’s premise of the exam’s portability. 
156. Sherwin P. Simmons, Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 125 A.B.A. ANN. 
REP. 183, 183−84 (2000). 
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place by anyone other than a lawyer.157  In the late 1990s, lawyers became 
acutely aware that the largest accounting firms (then the “Big Five,” now 
the “Big Four”) employed thousands of lawyers.158  In 1998, the ABA 
created a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to assess whether 
Model Rule 5.4 should be amended to allow entities that engaged in the 
practice of law and other activities could be owned in part or whole by non-
lawyers.  The Commission’s recommendations in support of MDPs were 
made available in time for the ABA’s August 1999 annual meeting.159  A 
final report supporting MDPs was filed the following year.160  Though the 
ABA House of Delegates rejected the Commission’s proposal that MDPs 
be allowed,161 forty-four state bar associations and the District of Columbia 
Bar Association created committees to assess MDPs.162  By July 2001, 
twelve of those task forces had favorably reported amendments to the 
lawyer-only ownership rule of professional conduct.163 
And then Enron collapsed.164  Enron’s auditor Arthur Andersen (one of 
the “Big Five”) was indicted, convicted, and dissolved by the end of 
2002.165  Other corporate and accounting scandals in 2001–2002 dissipated 
the interest in allowing MDPs.166  The District of Columbia Bar 
 
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (permitting, 
however, a lawyer to “include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though 
the plan is based in . . . a profit-sharing arrangement”). 
158. See Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMPLE 
L. REV. 869, 878–79 (1999) (noting 6,362 lawyers—excluding tax lawyers—worked for Big Five firms, 
making three of the Big Five among the ten largest law firms in the world). 
159. Sherwin P. Simmons et al., Report of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, 124 A.B.A. 
ANN. REP. 223, 225 (1999). 
160. Simmons, supra note 156, at 183–84. 
161. Proceedings for the Annual Meetings of the House of Delegates, 125 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1, 25 (2000). 
162. George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis 
of Inter-Professional Competition, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 857 n.21 (2006). 
163. Id. 
164. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 131 (2004) (“Every one of them was written up 
[in value] . . . .  Still: $400 million!  Even for Enron, that was a big hole, not easily papered over.” 
(alteration in original)). 
165. See id. at 143 (“There is a sad irony in the fact that Arthur Andersen was brought down by 
the Enron scandal.”). 
166. On those scandals, see Michael Ariens, “Playing Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over 
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 296–97 (2009), listing corporate and accounting 
scandals in the Appendix; Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black Enron 
Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002), linking the collapse of Enron to a reduced desire for MDPs). 
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Association was the only jurisdiction to amend its Rule 5.4 and allow 
MDPs.167 
The setback for those supportive of MDPs, often though not exclusively 
lawyers in large national and multi-national law firms, was allayed by the 
continued growth in corporate legal services during the early twenty-first 
century.  The share of legal services in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
the United States continued to increase.  Most of that increase was 
attributable to corporate clients.168 
The end of the sweet (economic) life occurred with the Great Recession 
in 2008.  A 2013 study listed eighteen law firms that went bankrupt between 
2008 and 2012.169  Many that survived continued to acquire lateral partners 
and their respective practice groups.  The largest and most profitable firms 
became ever larger and more profitable.  The focus of large firms on growth 
has continued during the past decade, even as the overall market for legal 
services has stalled. 
The emphasis on adding rainmakers as partners reduces the need or 
desire to promote associates to partner.  Those associates who are offered a 
partnership share are often given limited profit participation until they can 
demonstrate their economic value to the firm.  The relatively dim long-term 
prospect in becoming a partner for large law firm associates is one reason 
why those firms have increased the starting pay of law school graduates to 
$190,000 in 2018.170 
Further, the apparent inexorable increase in the complexity of law has 
forced corporate lawyers to find a legal niche that is both deep enough to 
avoid most competitive pressures and wide enough to serve a sufficiently 
broad clientele.  When specialization works, it creates a virtuous circle.  
Clients receive efficient legal service.  The lawyers who complete the legal 
services obtain greater expertise and enhance their future employment 
prospects.  The law firm employer may be better able to increase the hourly 
billing rate of those lawyers.  On the other hand, when the particular 
subspecialty disappears, the lawyer expert is often cast off, whether 
designated a “partner,” counsel, or associate. 
 
167. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (1996). 
168. Galanter, supra note 17, at  1378–79. 
169. See Wynne et al., supra note 36 (indicating that five of the eighteen firms operated for more 
than a century before going bankrupt). 
170. See Randazzo, supra note 34 (stating large law firms are offering higher starting salaries to 
attract top law students). 
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Legal specialization applies as well to lawyers who largely serve individual 
clients.  One marker of the modern legal profession is the recognition that 
all lawyers are incompetent in many areas.  This is not a matter of lacking 
the time to get “up to speed.”  It is a recognition of the increasing complexity 
of all of law.  Though the ABA began recognizing the need of lawyers to 
specialize by the early 1950s,171 the first states to recognize legal specialists 
were California in 1973,172 and Texas a year later.173  Those states began 
certifying lawyers as specialists in areas of law such as personal injury, 
criminal defense, family law, and other topics of interest to individual clients. 
The adoption by state bar associations of specialization certification 
allowed such lawyers to signal their expertise to prospective clients.  That 
signaling effect was muted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona.174  Bates held bans on truthful lawyer advertising were 
unconstitutional.175  This negated the ABA’s 1969 Code of Professional 
Responsibility provision absolutely banning lawyer advertising, a provision 
taken from its 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics.176  After Bates, some 
state bar associations attempted to limit a lawyer’s advertising of particular 
expertise.177  One of these limits was to restrict such claims to those legal 
fields officially recognized by the bar.  That limitation was held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.178 
Law firms seeking to attract individual clients, particularly those suffering 
personal injuries, have saturated old and new media.  This is due both to 
increased competition for injured clients, as personal injury law has changed 
 
171. See Ariens, supra note 21, at 1042–51 (describing the rise of legal specializations in the 
second half of the twentieth century); see also Eugene C. Gerhart, Organization for the Practice of Law: How 
Lawyers Conduct Their Practice, 37 A.B.A. J. 729, 730 (1951) (“[S]pecialization not only in the nature and 
class of questions dealt with, but also specialization in the character of clientage.”). 
172. See Standards for Specialization Announced, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 63, 80–87 (1973) (stating the 
standards for certification in different areas of law). 
173. See Richard Wells, Certification in Texas: Increasing Lawyer Competence and Aiding the Public in 
Lawyer Selection, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 689, 689 n.1 (1978) (noting the creation of specialization 
certification programs by the executive director of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization). 
174. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
175. Id. at 384. 
176. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908). 
177. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., A Net Loss: Firm Challenges Florida Bar Over Website Ad Limits, 
ABA J., Mar. 2014, at 22, 23 (stating lawyers have challenged the Florida Bar, “which prohibited lawyers 
from calling themselves specialists or experts unless they have achieved certain certification programs 
by the state bar or a national organization whose certification program has been approved by the bar”). 
178. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 104–06 (1990). 
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in the past several decades, and to structural changes in such firms.  Personal 
injury law firms traditionally lacked the institutional base to survive the loss 
of their founders.  In part, this was due to the fact that personal injury law 
firms, and most firms serving individual clients, were small in size.  This is 
no longer true.  Indeed, some personal injury firms tout their size (and 
various skills) as a reason to choose them.179  Marketing personal legal 
services in a digital age requires significant initial and continuing 
investments.  The size of such investments makes scale an effective 
competitive tool. 
B. Modern Litigation 
In a 1973 lecture at Fordham University School of Law, Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger bemoaned the state of trial advocacy and urged the 
creation of certification standards for advocates.180  Soon thereafter, the 
Judicial Council of the Second Circuit created a committee to make 
recommendations concerning admission to practice in United States District 
Courts in the Second Circuit.181  That committee, informally known as the 
Clare Committee, suggested a lawyer demonstrate participation in, or 
attendance at, four merits proceedings, including two in federal district 
court.182  A second approach—taken at the end of the 1970s by the Devitt 
Committee183—urged greater emphasis in law schools on trial advocacy 
alongside other recommendations.  One of the Devitt Committee’s 
additional recommendations was the creation of a pilot program to be 
assessed by a newly-crafted committee, known as the King Committee.184  
The King Committee recommended those who wished to try cases in 
federal district courts demonstrate a knowledge of federal procedure and 
evidence, as shown by passing a test, as well as proof that the applicant 
possessed some trial experience.185 
 
179. Attorneys, THOMAS J. HENRY, https://thomasjhenrylaw.com/attorneys [https://perma. 
cc/J7XD-SAPL] (claiming the firm “employs more than 100 highly skilled attorneys” in five cities in 
Texas and is “one of the leading personal injury firms in the nation”). 
180. Burger, supra note 51, at 227. 
181. Qualifications for Practice Before the United States Courts in the Second Circuit, 
67 F.R.D. 159, 161 (1975). 
182. Id. at 188. 
183. Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the 
Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States, 83 F.R.D. 215, 215 (1979). 
184. Id. 
185. See Ariens, supra note 138, at 663 (noting the King Committee’s recommendations). 
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Chief Justice Burger’s recommendations occurred as lawyers perceived 
an increase in litigation, particularly civil litigation.186  Whether the United 
States suffered from a civil “litigation explosion” remains a contentious 
issue.187  Federal district court case filings between 1970 and 1990 increased 
by 50% in tort matters and 180% in commercial matters.188  As one 
perceptive historian noted, “Though evidence of a ‘litigation explosion’ is 
slim, there is plenty of evidence of what we might call a ‘liability 
explosion[.]’”189  The explosion of tort liability is traceable both to the 
adoption of strict liability in tort and the end of types of status immunities 
(such as husband-wife and parent-child).  Civil liability expanded in the 
1960s; that expansion accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s.190 
The expansion of civil liability was part of a broader “rights” revolution, 
which emphasized the effectuation of individual rights.191  The liability 
explosion was a product of both private practice and public interest lawyers.  
The latter largely consisted of politically liberal law firms by the mid-
1970s.192  Conservative public interest law firms then formed during the 
second half of the 1970s.193 Like their forebears, they too focused on 
 
186. See Burger, supra note 51, at 234 (“The trial of a ‘serious’ case . . . calls for the kind of 
special skills and experience that insurance companies, for example, seek out to defend damage 
claims.”). 
187. OLSON, supra note 59, at 1.  But see Lawrence M. Friedman, The Litigation Revolution, in 
3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 175, 176–77 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008) (stating evidence of the litigation explosion is slim). 
188. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences 
Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 
1288–89 (2005) (noting population increase at the same time was 25% and increase in GDP was 90%). 
189. Friedman, supra note 187, at 176. 
190. See OLSON, supra note 59, at 1 (“The trend proceeded gradually over decades and then 
quite suddenly moved into high gear in the late 1960s and 1970s . . . .”). 
191. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1998) (noting the rise of the rights revolution). 
192. About ninety politically liberal public interest law firms existed in 1975.  ANN 
SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 12 
(John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds. 2008); see also BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 50–51 (1978) (counting eighty-six politically 
liberal public interest law firms). 
193. See JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS 
AND THE REMAKING OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 8 (2016) (asserting conservative public 
interest groups were created to fight back against liberal public interest groups that challenged the 
government’s authority); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 
62 (2008) (discussing the need for conservative public interest groups to expand in the 1970s to work 
in the new legal regime). 
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individual rights claims, though different types of rights claims.  Both liberal 
and conservative public interest law firms routinely used litigation as a tool 
for social and political reform.  Many of these  nonprofit entities prospered, 
and their work expanded to policy making outside of the courthouse, 
including legislative policy proposals.194 
Despite (or possibly because of) the liability explosion, the number of 
cases that ended during or after trial continued a century-long decline.195  
In federal courts, the percentage of civil cases that ended during or after trial 
was 19.9% in 1938, 12.1% in 1952, and 1.7% in 2003.196  A recent review 
of the “vanishing”197 American trial showed that the absolute number of 
civil trials in federal district courts has declined since its peak in 1985.198  In 
2016, the percentage of civil cases disposed of during or after trial reached 
a record low of 1.03%.199  A similar story was found in state court 
dispositions from the mid-1970s through 2002.200 
The record in criminal matters is similar.  The 2016 annual study of the 
United States Sentencing Commission reported that 97.3% of federal 
offenders pled guilty, a percentage that “has been consistent for more than 
15 years.”201  The high plea rate may be due to the fact that half of those 
pleading guilty receive a sentence below the sentencing guideline range.202  
In cases in which the government possesses overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
the possibility of a lower sentence may be a sufficient incentive to plead 
guilty.  The caseload carried by prosecutors may also give them the incentive 
 
194. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1272–73 (2005) (discussing the use of ADR and non-trial adjudication by public interest 
law firms). 
195. Id. at 1256–58. 
196. Id. at 1258–59 . 
197. See Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. v, v (2004) 
(discussing the creation of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Vanishing Trial Project). 
198. Graham K. Bryant & Kristopher R. McClellan, The Disappearing Civil Trial: Implications for 
the Future of Law Practice, 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 287, 294 fig.1 (2018). 
199. Id. at 295 fig.2. 
200. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 755, 773 (2004). 
201. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES–FISCAL 
YEAR 2016, at 4 (2017) (highlighting the minimal change in guilty plea rates from 2015 to 2016), with 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES–FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 4 
(2016)  [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N FY 2015] (reporting 97.1% of offenders plead guilty 
during fiscal year 2015). 
202. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N FY 2015, supra note 201, at 4. 
29
Ariens: Modern American Legal Profession, 1969–Present
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
700 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:671 
to agree to a plea and a relatively low sentence.203  Trial may be necessary 
when public interest exists due to the notorious nature of the alleged crime.  
But those cases are relatively few and far between.  And a defendant may 
refuse to plead guilty if the proposed bargain lacks the muster promised.  
Finally, some accused may demand a trial because they believe even a 
minuscule chance for an acquittal is better than the sentence issued after a 
plea.204 
The reasons for the decline in civil trials are unclear.  The opportunities 
for pre-trial discovery expanded in the 1970s, especially for those defending 
against liability, lengthening the period between the filing of the complaint 
and trial.  Further, damage awards in a number of cases increased in the 
1970s, possibly making defendants more cautious about trying a case.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which applied to federal cases beginning in 1975, 
and which were adopted with relatively few changes by more than half of 
the states, emphasized the broad authority of trial courts to make 
discretionary decisions on evidentiary disputes.205  This enhanced the risks 
for both parties, as it made appeals from the loser at trial less likely to 
succeed.206  Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through the early 
1980s, lawyers and judges made ever more claims of discovery abuse and 
overzealous advocacy.207  Part of the reason for claims of discovery abuse 
may relate to efforts by parties to increase the costs of a case in order to 
create a more favorable environment for settlement.  By the early 1980s, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended twice to counteract such 
abuse, including allowing sanctions for frivolous claims and arguments.208  
This had relatively little impact on lawyer behavior. 
 
203. See id. at 1 (“The United States Sentencing Commission received information on 71,184 
federal criminal cases in which the offender was sentenced in fiscal year 2015.” (footnote omitted)). 
204. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) (holding the defendant had a 
constitutional right to assert an absence of guilt even in the face of overwhelming evidence against him 
when his counsel tactically admitted his guilt in an attempt to avoid the death penalty). 
205. See Michael Ariens, Progress Is Our Only Product: Legal Reform and the Codification of Evidence, 
17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 213, 252–53 (1992) (noting the Federal Rules of Evidence was premised on the 
authority of trial judges to make discretionary decisions on admission of evidence). 
206. See Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 20, 2016) 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals [https://perma.cc/5KS3-
V57B ] (noting in Table 2 that the reversal rate by courts of appeals from 2011–2015 was between 
5.8%–6.9% in criminal cases and 10.4%–14.2% in private civil cases). 
207. Ariens, supra note 38, at 721–23. 
208. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 532–34 (1980); 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983). 
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A zealous civil defense lawyer did not have to make a frivolous argument 
to make it more difficult for a plaintiff to obtain a monetary settlement or 
judgment.  The lawyer simply made it more costly for the plaintiff to recover 
through extensive, and then more extensive, discovery.  A primary defense 
strategy of tobacco companies in personal injury claims was to make 
litigation as costly as possible.209  For a long time that approach successfully 
shielded them from liability.  That template has been followed by many.  A 
recent example is the invasion of privacy suit brought by Terry Bollea (Hulk 
Hogan) against Gawker Media.210  It appears part of Gawker’s litigation 
goal was to force Bollea to spend until he exhausted all of his funds.211  The 
contentiousness of the discovery process required the Florida state trial 
court to use a special magistrate to assess evidentiary claims, on whom 
“[n]early a million dollars” were spent.212  In Conspiracy, Ryan Holiday notes 
the “[l]egal filings alone amounted to some 25,000 pages[,]” including 
“hundreds of motions and responses and motions in response to responses 
to motions.”213  Holiday further explains the parties argued at “at least fifty 
in-person hearings” before trial.214  Although no final accounting is given, 
it appears that Peter Thiel, who secretly financed Bollea’s case from the 
beginning, may have spent more than $10 million.215 
Lawyers for plaintiffs can give as well as they get in discovery, as 
happened in Bollea v. Gawker.216  However, the financial incentive to delay 
by extending discovery is generally with defense lawyers, who ordinarily bill 
by the hour, and defendants, who may wish to delay any payment.  Plaintiffs 
and their lawyers have a contrary incentive.  The disparities in financing led 
to innovations in how cases were managed by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Two early 
 
209. See MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE 
WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO 355–56 (1999) (discussing discovery disputes in an 
early victory in tobacco litigation in Mississippi). 
210. See HOLIDAY, supra note 62, at 194–95 (describing how both parties manipulated the 
discovery process to increase cost and drag out the litigation). 
211. See id. at 195 (“One Gawker motion contain[ed] sixty-two exhibits, and from the seemingly 
endless coffers of Peter Thiel some $70,000 is drawn with which to respond and defend against that 
motion.”). 
212. Id. at 194. 
213. Id. at 194–95. 
214. Id. at 195. 
215. Id. at 226. 
216. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
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examples were asbestos217 and tobacco litigation,218 in which plaintiffs’ 
lawyers joined to share information and costs.219  Soon plaintiffs’ personal 
injury lawyers also joined together to file class action lawsuits.220  More 
recently, several litigation-finance companies have been created, which 
finance lawsuits in exchange for a percentage of any future award.221 
The scale of the earnings of the most successful plaintiffs was astounding 
from the 1970s on.  The most famous example was the fee Texas lawyer Joe 
Jamail earned in the late 1980s representing Pennzoil in its lawsuit against 
Texaco.  It was variously reported as between $300 and $420 million.222  
That began Jamail’s stay at the top of intermittent lawyer income stories.  
The lawyers involved in the tobacco litigation settled in the late 1990s— 
earning several billion dollars.223  Other plaintiffs’ lawyers have also made 
an extraordinary amount of money.224  But most personal injury lawyers 




217. See WILKIE, supra note 61, at 46 (referring to the joining of attorneys Richard “Dickie” 
Scruggs and Roberts Wilson, creating the enterprise Asbestos Group, to handle claims against the 
industry). 
218. See id. at 56 (recounting how Richard Scruggs was aided by Don Barrett in the litigation 
against Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation).  
219. Id. 
220. See id. at 108 (stating numerous class actions across the country were led by Richard 
Scruggs). 
221. See Sara Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job: Litigation Finance, WALL ST. J. (July 5,  
2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-hot-law-job-litigation-finance-1530783000 
[https://perma.cc/DG32-8BSG] (reporting Longford Capital Management LP raised $566.5 million 
since 2011, “committing $330.3 million to 38 investments, including portfolios with multiple lawsuits”); 
see also LEGALIST, LITIGATION FINANCE GUIDE 3 (2017), https://www.legalist.com/guides/guide-to-
litigation-finance/ [https://perma.cc/UC5R-V7HH] (“Litigation financing is the practice where a 
third party provides capital to a plaintiff involved in litigation in return for some financial recovery 
from the lawsuit.”). 
222. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 274 (2011) 
(questioning whether the Texas Supreme court was corrupt based on the astronomical amount of 
money plaintiff lawyer Joe Jamail earned). 
223. See Daniel J. Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2827, 2827–28 (1999) (noting lawyers shared several billion dollars in fees). 
224. See generally LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES 
REALLY COST AMERICA 35–36 (2011) (considering the potential for contingency fees to lend to 
extremely high hourly rates and asserting that the collection of such enormous fees implicates a public 
interest).  See, e.g., DILLON & CANNON, supra note 61, at 2–3 (discussing how plaintiff securities 
litigation lawyer William “Bill” Lerach and the firm in which he was a partner won damages totaling 
$45 billion, receiving a fee of up to 30% of the amount). 
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good living, but rarely became wealthy in the practice of law.225 
The ordinary does not become news; extraordinary monetary verdicts, on 
the other hand, gain national attention.  The extraordinary was that 
settlements and verdicts in personal injury cases had skyrocketed.  The 
most-referenced example is Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants.226  A woman 
purchased coffee from the drive-through lane at a McDonald’s.  She spilled 
it on her lap, causing her third-degree burns.  She was awarded nearly 
$2.9 million in actual and punitive damages by a jury (later reduced by the 
court to $640,000).227  Though the actions of the jury, and Liebeck, were 
defended ably, the newsmakers used the case to urge tort reform.228  They 
succeeded. 
One example of such tort reform was in Texas in 2003.  The legislature’s 
actions made “it much harder for [plaintiffs’ lawyers] to pursue their chosen 
specialty profitably.”229  Soon thereafter, federal district judge Janis Jack, 
seated in Corpus Christi, issued an opinion declaring a diagnoses of silicosis 
unreliable and misjoinder of 10,000 plaintiffs in a mass tort matter.230  Her 
opinion served as a loud signal that the heyday of mass tort cases was over.  
Such cases still exist, but no longer draw significant attention from the 
general media. 
Another consequence of the changes in litigation over the past fifty years 
is the professionalism debate.  To what extent are lawyers different from 
others who sell their services?  The traditional answer was that lawyers were 
professionals, and as such, lawyers were required to remain independent of 
their clients.231  That is, they were required to say “no” to some of their 
clients’ desires.  By 1983, the effects of the long economic slog of the 1970s 
 
225. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, TORT REFORM, PLAINTIFFS’ LAWYERS, AND 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 138–39 (2015) (explaining the tactics plaintiffs’ lawyer use to get clients and how 
expensive advertising can be). 
226. Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. 
Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1994). 
227. See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, 
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 193–95 (2004) (recounting the history of the case and how newspapers 
interpreted it). 
228. See id. at 195–96 (“[F]ragmentary accounts and misleading factoids would facilitate 
intercessions by reform-oriented and reform-influenced commentators to spin the case as another 
instance of frivolous litigation.”). 
229. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 225, at 31. 
230. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
231. See Ariens, supra note 9, at 580 (discussing the traditional aspects of lawyer 
professionalism). 
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had led to a greater interest among lawyers to say “yes” to their clients.232  
One perceived example of this desire was the rise of Rambo-style lawyering 
in litigation.233  This was the type of overzealous advocacy on behalf of 
clients that many lawyers (and some of the public) decried. 
The ABA created a Special Commission on Professionalism that urged a 
return to the principles of professionalism and away from utter 
commercialism.234  That Commission’s well-publicized report was followed 
by a suggestion from the ABA Section on Torts and Insurance Practice that 
bar associations adopt a professionalism creed—an explicit statement of 
those professionalism principles.235  Over a quarter-century later, 123 
civility or professionalism codes have been adopted by state and local bar 
associations and courts.236  Further, Arizona, Florida, and South Carolina 
have made lawyer’s repeated violations of the creed grounds for 
discipline.237 
C. The Bureaucratization of Legal Ethics 
The ABA’s 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility was extraordinarily 
popular.  The vast majority of state bar associations adopted the Code with 
few, if any, revisions.  Yet that popularity was no deeper than the thinnest 
 
232. See id. at 587–88 (“The ‘lawyer as hired gun’ metaphor rose as the ideal of the lawyer as 
independent of her client fell.  This shift was in significant part due to a several-fold sorting within the 
legal profession that accelerated between 1970 and 1984.”). 
233. See Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 
17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1990) (addressing the “‘Rambo,’ ‘take no prisoners’ attitude” many lawyers 
possess when using unfair tactics and intimidation); see also Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why 
Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, ABA J., Mar. 1988, at 79, 79 (discussing the characteristics of Rambo-style 
lawyering). 
234. See Ariens, supra note 39, at 51 (tracing the history of the Special Commission on 
Professionalism). 
235. See id. at 51 (detailing how the report’s title, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for the 
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, indicated the Special Commission’s opinions of professionalism in 
the American legal profession). 
236. See id. at 51 n.17 (noting the count of civility and/or professionalism codes compiled by 
the author’s then-research assistant Sumner Macdaniel). 
237. See ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 31 (stating lawyers “will conduct [themselves] in accordance with 
the . . . Creed of Professionalism when dealing with . . . client[s], opposing parties, their counsel, 
tribunals[,] and the general public”); In re Code for resolving Professionalism Complaints, 116 So. 3d 
280, 282 (Fla. 2013) (ordering the adoption of the Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, 
which is the basis for imposing discipline for violations); In re White, 707 S.E.2d 411, 416 (S.C. 2011) 
(upholding a lawyer’s definite ninety-day suspension from practice for “blatant incivility and lack of 
decorum”). 
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topsoil.  The slings and arrows suffered by the Code were mercifully ended 
when the ABA created a new Special Commission on Evaluation of Ethical 
Standards in 1977.238 
This Special Commission, known as the Kutak Commission, worked in a 
transformed environment.239  The Special Committee drafting the Code 
worked out of sight, hearing from few and reporting little for four years.240  
The Kutak Commission brought in experts to assist them, and reported 
publicly its “Working Draft” less than two years after its formation, in time 
for discussion at the August 1979 ABA Annual Meeting.241  But the Kutak 
Commission was working after Watergate in a time in which “transparency” 
was both a watchword and a cudgel.242  Critics disparaged the 
Commission’s work as done in secret and failing to meet the needs of the 
clients of private practice lawyers, whether corporations, criminals, or 
both.243  The Kutak Commission’s earliest efforts placed limits on the 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client, including the duty to keep client 
confidences.244  When the Discussion Draft was publicly issued on 
January 30, 1980, the Commission had softened some of this limiting 
language.  Critics remained unconvinced.245  The Proposed Final Draft was 
published in May 1981.  Many of the same critics made many of the same 
criticisms, and this was true when the Final Draft was distributed a year 
later.246 
The discussion in the ABA House of Delegates in August 1982 was 
disastrous for the Kutak Commission.247  The House failed to address most 
of the Final Draft, and the Kutak Commission barely escaped dismissal.248  
The February 1983 Midyear Meeting was just as eventful.  The House of 
 
238. Ariens, supra note 38, at 689–90. 
239. See Ariens, supra note 39, at 77 (emphasizing the change in the legal profession and clash 
with the goals of the Kutak Commission). 
240. Id. 
241. See Ariens, supra note 38, at 706 (discussing the extreme negative reactions to the Kutak 
Commission’s “Working Draft”). 
242. Id. n.117 (“[T]he Commission’s limited release demonstrated a lack of transparency.”). 
243. Id. at 712. 
244. See id. at 706–09 (“[There] were particular concern[s] with the Commission’s decisions 
concerning the limits of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.”). 
245. Id. at 709–18. 
246. Id. at 710–14, 718; Annual Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 
107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 828, 920–21 exh. D (1982). 
247. Ariens, supra note 38, at 738–39 n.370. 
248. Id. at 739. 
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Delegates, reflecting the broader legal profession, reached opposing 
conclusions about what it meant to be an American lawyer.  For example, 
what were the limits on advising a client who might then engage in 
fraudulent or criminal action?  The Kutak Commission believed a lawyer 
was constrained if the lawyer “reasonably should know” the conduct was 
fraudulent or criminal.  The House allowed the lawyer to counsel a client, 
or assist a client in conduct, provided the lawyer did not “know” of the 
unlawful nature of the client’s activities.249  The fracture within the 
profession was shown by the narrowness of the vote, 250  158 to 144.251 
This pattern continued.  A broad understanding of the lawyer’s duties 
beyond those to his client was rejected in favor of emphasizing the lawyer-
client bond.252  The resulting Model Rules of Professional Conduct thus 
became based on the idea that the lawyer’s most important duty was client 
loyalty.253  This was not what the Kutak Commission had in mind.  Further, 
by adopting a Restatement-like rules approach, the impression received by 
lawyers was that standards of ethics were solely about avoiding breaking the 
rules.  These were rules presented in the negative, as “thou shalt nots.” 
The fracture among lawyers concerning ethical behavior continued in the 
adoption process.254  Most state bar associations eventually adopted the 
Model Rules, but they did so more haltingly and less straightforwardly.   
The Kutak Commission’s Reporter, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., was named 
Director of the American Law Institute (ALI) the year after adoption of the 
Model Rules by the ABA.255  Hazard promoted the drafting of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in part to respond to 
the approach to legal ethics taken by the House of Delegates.256  In  
1999, the ALI adopted this Restatement.257  By then, the ABA had initiated 
  
 
249. See Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 
292–93 (1983) (approving proposed amended to Final Draft language which reflected the accepted 
standards of counsel). 
250. See id. (approving a proposed amendment to the Final Draft language, which reflected the 
accepted standards of counsel). 
251. Id. at 293. 
252. Ariens, supra note 38, at 691–92. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 693. 
255. Herbert Wechsler, Report of the Director, 60 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 5, 14 (1983). 
256. See Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 727–28 (1998) (discussing the basis of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers). 
257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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another effort regarding rules of ethics: the Ethics 2000 Commission.258 
The Ethics 2000 Commission refreshed the issue of the extent of the 
lawyer’s duty to keep client confidences.259  In 1983, the House of 
Delegates rejected limits on this duty.260  Not only was a lawyer not required 
to disclose a client confidence to prevent a future fraud upon a third party, 
the lawyer was not permitted to do so in the ABA’s Model Rules.261  This 
policy was rejected by a number of states.262  The Ethics 2000 Commission 
tried again.  And it failed again.  At the ABA’s August 2001 Annual Meeting, 
the House of Delegates rejected giving a lawyer discretion to disclose a client 
confidence in such circumstances.263 
And again, there was the Enron scandal.  Within two years, the ABA 
House of Delegates had agreed that lawyers may disclose confidences to 
prevent future frauds and rectify certain past frauds.264  The division seen 
in 1983 remained in existence in 2003: the vote in favor of the amendments 
to Model Rule 1.6 was by the narrow margin of 218–201.265  By doing so, 
the ABA successfully derailed a federal effort to regulate the conduct of 
lawyers.266  But it did so by acceding ever so slightly to the demands of 
those who perceived the rules of ethics as made for the interests of lawyers 
and their clients—not the public.  ABA members had not covered 
themselves in glory and seemed willing to limit their affection for their 
clients only to the extent it was necessary to meet the public outcry.  They 
retained the idea that ethics was merely about what one could not do. 




258. Report of the President, 122 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 755, 755–56 (1997). 
259. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 126 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1, 7 (2001).  
260. Ariens, supra note 38, at 740. 
261. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 259, at 34–35.  Relatedly, 
lawyers were not permitted to disclose a past fraud committed by a client who did so in part using, 
unwittingly, the lawyer’s services.  Ariens, supra note 38, at 740. 
262. Proceedings for the Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 259, at 35–37. 
263. See id. (adopting amendment to strike Rule 1.6(b)(2) from Ethics 2000 proposals due to its 
contradiction with core values of the legal profession). 
264. See Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the ABA House of Delegates, 128 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 
1, 14–18 (2003) (highlighting the House’s prior refusal to adopt client fraud disclosure rules). 
265. Compare Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 249, at 298 
(describing the narrow vote of 207 to 129 to approve the proposed amendments to Model Rule 1.6(b)), 
with Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, supra note 264, at 18–19 (noting the 
close vote to amend Rule 1.6 in 2003). 
266. Ariens, supra note 166, at 275, 278–81. 
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20/20.267  The Ethics 20/20 Commission, created in the wake of the Great 
Recession, offered the same justifications as past ABA Commissions for its 
creation: a transformed legal profession.  Though the pace of technological 
change was given as one reason for the creation of the Ethics 2000 
Commission, the Ethics 20/20 Commission claimed such change was taking 
place even more rapidly.  The need for amendments to the ethical rules 
guiding lawyers was necessary because “[t]echnology and globalization [had] 
transformed the practice of law in ways the profession could not anticipate 
in 2002.”268 
Despite the allegedly increasing pace of change, the Ethics 20/20 
Commission did “not recommend changes to [ABA] basic regulatory 
construct.”269  Likewise,  Model Rule 1.6 on confidences was amended to 
require lawyers to make “reasonable” efforts to prevent the theft of client 
information stored in the cloud or otherwise possibly available to cyber 
thieves.270  A couple of other changes were proposed, but none were 
striking. 
The Commission concluded its goal was to make recommendations “that 
respond to a rapidly changing legal marketplace while preserving the legal 
profession’s core values.”271  The Commission assumed, rather than 
explained, what those “core values” were.  This has been a persistent 
problem in both ABA Commissions and Task Forces, and in the wider 
profession.  The over-arching question for lawyers remains: What, if 
anything, does it mean to be a lawyer? 
When the ABA Special Commission on Professionalism issued its final 
report in 1987, it spoke of the lawyer’s duty to promote and develop 
“integrity, competence, fairness, independence, courage and a devotion to 
 
267. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INTRODUCTION AND  




269. Id. at 2. 
270. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[T]he 
lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of 
unintended recipients.  This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security 
measures . . . .”). 
271. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 267, at 13.  
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the public interest.”272  All good things, and the Commission well knew 
that rules of ethics would have little if any impact on those developments 
within the profession.  In its second overall recommendation, the 
Commission urged the bar to  “abide by higher standards of conduct than 
the minimum required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”273  That ideal remains tantalizingly 
just out of reach. 
The problem is, of course, that the ABA is chasing up-to-date legal ethics 
rules as a greyhound tracks a mechanical rabbit.  It is futile for the ABA to 
believe it can ever meet the challenges to the meaning of professional 
behavior by use of rules of ethics, and the Ethics 20/20 Commission’s 
reiteration of the rapidity of change suggests it understands this.  Even in 
legal ethics, the emphasis on the scale of technological change, not what 
ethics has to do with the practice of law, indicates the immensity of the 
transformation of the legal profession. 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
The pressure on lawyers over the past half century, intensified by the 
desire for scale, has taken its toll on the legal profession.  In 2016, a study 
of substance abuse among 12,825 practicing American lawyers was 
published.274  Among the participants, “20.6% screen[ed] positive for 
hazardous, harmful, and potentially alcohol-dependent drinking.”275  The 
authors concluded that “[a]ttorneys experience problematic drinking . . . 
consistent with alcohol use disorders at a higher rate than other professional 
populations.”276  A study of law students reached similar results: “[R]oughly 
one-quarter to one-third of respondents reported frequent binge drinking 
or misuse of drugs, and/or reported mental health challenges.”277 
It is unclear whether these numbers (if replicated) reflect a new trend in 
the legal profession and in legal education.  Change, of course, can add 
 
272. JUSTIN A. STANLEY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ‘. . . IN THE 
SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:’ A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 
(1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 265 (1987). 
273. Id. 
274. Patrick R. Krill et al., The Prevalence of Substance Use and Other Mental Health Concerns Among 
American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 46 (2016). 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Jerome M. Organ et al., Suffering in Silence: The Survey of Law Student Well-Being and the 
Reluctance of Law Students to Seek Help for Substance Use and Mental Health Concerns, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 116, 
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stress, and an abundance of stress may lead to anxiety.  One way to alleviate 
anxiety is through self-medication and abuse of harmful substances. 
Lawyers have always faced significant stress in their professional lives.  
Modern times are no different.  Despite suggestions to the contrary, lawyers 
from every era have worked at a time of rapid change.  Whether such change 
comes from society or its technological marvels is unimportant.  To work 
as a lawyer requires resilience in the face of professional stress.  To work as 
a private practice lawyer requires a willingness to accept risk, to work 
without a net in front of a crowd. 
Keeping that anxiety at bay requires lawyers to remind themselves that 
their clients need their services.  And for those just beginning the practice 
of law, there are millions of people with legal needs who cannot (or believe 
they cannot) afford legal services.  These are challenging times.  Yet, many 
who study the legal services market have concluded that these are also 
opportunistic times.  The pressure to use scale to compete will continue to 
build, but so will the opportunity to meet those legal needs long unserved. 
As noted a long time ago, it is always the best of times and the worst of 
times. 
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